We study the long-run relationship between nominal exchange rates and monetary fundamentals in a quarterly panel of 18 countries extending from 1973.1 to 1997.1. Our analysis is centered on two issues. First, we test whether exchange rates are cointegrated with long-run determinants predicted by economic theory. These results generally support the hypothesis of cointegration. The second issue is to re-examine the ability for monetary fundamentals to forecast future exchange rate returns. Panel regression estimates and forecasts con¯rm that this forecasting power is signi¯cant.
Introduction
Recent studies have found that monetary fundamentals forecast nominal exchange rate returns (percent changes in the exchange rate) [see Mark (1995) , Chinn and Meese (1995) , Chen and Mark (1996) , MacDonald and Taylor (1993) , and MacDonald and Marsh (1997) ]. Much of the evidence centers around signi¯cant slope coe±cient estimates in regressions of future exchange rate returns on the deviation of the log exchange rate from monetary fundamentals and upon the dominance of prediction accuracy generated by these regressions over the random walk in out out-of-sample forecasting. As in studies of stock returns [e.g., Fama and French (1988) , Campbell and Shiller (1988) , Hodrick (1992) ], there is a tendency for exchange return regression 2 slope coe±cients and R s to increase in magnitude as the return horizon is lengthened. Similarly, out-of-sample forecast accuracy of monetary fundamentals relative to the random walk tends to improve with prediction horizon.
The relatively short time-series available for these studies combined with the high degree of dependence across overlapping observations of long-horizon exchange rate returns have made statistical inference a thorny issue and the robustness of the link between monetary fundamentals and the nominal exchange rate has been called into question by several authors. For example, Kilian (1997) ¯nds less favorable evidence for exchange rate predictability by updating Mark's (1995) data set and employing a less restrictive data generating process in building parametric bootstrap distributions upon which to draw inference. Similarly, Berkowitz and Giorgianni (1997) and Berben and Van Dijk (1998) argue that noncointegration between exchange rates and their monetary fundamentals render the independent variable in these regressions nonstationary so that standard hypothesis testing procedures produce misleading in-1 ferences and need to be modi¯ed. Moreover, all three authors argue that long-horizon regressions o®er no statistical power gains over short-horizon regressions. This paper is motivated by these recent critiques. We aim to improve on the imprecise univariate estimates and forecasts by exploiting available cross-sectional information in a panel data set. We analyze quarterly observations that begin on 1973.1 and extend through 1997.1 for 18 countries. We are focused on two main issues. The¯rst of these is whether nominal exchange rates are cointegrated with monetary fundamentals. To research this problem, we draw on Pedroni (1997) who suggests methods for conducting cointegration tests on panel data.
The second issue that we examine concerns the forecasting power of monetary fundamentals in a panel version of the long-horizon regression of currency returns on the deviation of the log exchange rate from the monetary fundamentals. To apply the standard regression analysis of stationary observations we must assume cointegration between the exchange rate and the fundamentals. On the other hand, if no cointegration is assumed, Berben and Van Dijk (1998) show that the univariate long-horizon regression tests can be interpreted as tests for weak exogeneity of the fundamentals. Under the null hypothesis of no cointegration, they show that the OLS slope coe±-cient has a nondegenerate asymptotic distribution which is a mixture of the normal and a Dickey{Fuller type distribution and the test of the hypothesis that the slope coe±cient is zero becomes a test of the joint null hypothesis of no cointegration and no predictability. While we do not employ Berben and Van Dijk's asymptotic analysis, we draw on their argument to justify our prediction analysis to readers who are unconvinced by the cointegration tests.
We examine the predictability issue¯rst by studying the estimated slope coe±-cient in the panel short-horizon regression. We con¯ne this analysis to a one-period forecast horizon to avoid the complications arising from serially correlated error terms that would be induced by overlapping multiperiod forecast horizons and to re°ect the growing consensus that long-horizon regressions o®er no statistical power advantages over short-horizon regressions. Secondly, we conduct an out-of-sample forecast experiment using the panel regression over the period extending from 1983.1 through 1997.1. In this analysis we report results at two forecast horizons|one and sixteen quarters. It is not the objective of the paper to build the best forecasting model. In that regard, a¯xed coe±cient linear regression model is quite naive. Instead, our intent is to examine the extent to which monetary fundamentals matter at all for nominal exchange rate dynamics.
As is typically done in forecast evaluation, we compare our fundamentals predictions to those of the random walk, but we also compare the exchange rate return forecasts by monetary fundamentals to forecasts by purchasing power parity (PPP). A growing body of empirical research employing panel methods on post 1973 data 2 concludes that PPP holds over the°oat. With the re{emergence of PPP as a viable long{run equilibrium condition for nominal exchange rate determination, and its central role in motivating the use of monetary fundamentals it is a logical and useful exercise to compare its predictive performance to those of the monetary fundamen-tals. Since the monetary model is frequently built upon PPP, the presumption is that asymptotically both approaches will yield equal prediction performance.
All hypothesis tests that we conduct are based on parametric bootstrap distributions built on an estimated data generating process. We use the parametric bootstrap so as to control for potential¯nite sample size distortion of asymptotic tests. In addition, the parametric bootstrap allows us to model cross-sectional dependence in the data which surely is present in the data but which typically violates the regularity conditions under which the available asymptotic theory is derived.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the form of the monetary fundamentals predicted by theory that we use in our empirical analysis. Section 2 describes our data set. The panel cointegration and panel prediction analyses conducted on U.S. dollar exchange rates is covered in sections 3 4 respectively. Section 5 brie°y discusses results using Swiss franc and yen exchange rates. Section 6 concludes.
Monetary Fundamentals and the Exchange Rate
Let s be the time-t log nominal exchange rate between country i = 1; 2; : : : ; N it and the`numeraire' country, which we label as country`0.' The exchange rate is country i's currency price of a unit of currency 0 so an increase in s means an it appreciation in value of 0's money. Let the time-t log nominal money stock and log real income of country i be denoted by m and y respectively. We refer to the longit it run equilibrium exchange rate as the`monetary fundamental value,' which we write as
where the long-run neutrality of money has been imposed and (® ; ® ) are¯xed pai 0 rameters. Eq.(1) is a generic representation of the long-run equilibrium exchange rate implied by modern theories of exchange rate determination. The common feature shared by the various theories is that the long-run equilibrium exchange rate is governed by determinants of money market equilibrium at home and abroad. In the monetary models of Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976) , for example, ® can be interpreted as the income elasticity of money demand and is predicted to be positive. In Lucas's (1982) equilibrium model, ®, which can depend on preference parameters, 3 can possibly be negative but its value is bounded from above by 1. The Obstfeld 3 In the Lucas model, the log equilibrium nominal exchange rate is given by m¡m +(y +ln U ) ¡ easy to see that a shock that raises y can lower the marginal utility of consuming y su±ciently to 3 and Rogo® (1995) model on the other hand, predicts that per capita consumption enter in place of real income. The particular details|whether to include income, as in Lucas, or consumption levels as in Obstfeld and Rogo®|di®er, but the general theoretical prediction is the same. Namely that the exchange rate is determined by monetary fundamentals. This is not a controversial proposition but establishing this principle with a satisfactory degree of statistical accuracy has been di±cult. Our analysis centers on two empirical questions. First, we examine whether the monetary fundamentals given in (1) serves as an attractor for the nominal exchange rate. We address this problem in section 3 by testing whether whether ff g and it fs g are cointegrated using procedures developed for the analysis of panel data. Secit ond, we examine the ability for deviations of the exchange rate from its monetary fundamentals value, x´f ¡ s ;
it it it to forecast future exchange rate returns in a panel regression.
The Data
Our data consists of quarterly time series observations from 1973.1 through 1997.1 for the following 18 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The composition of the sample was determined by data availability and by a requirement that the country's post Bretton Woods exchange rate experience was dominated by°oating against the U.S. dollar. While some of the countries in the sample did experience episodes of nominal exchange rate pegging, those periods were deemed to have been reasonably brief.
Nominal exchange rates are end-of-quarter observations from the IFS CD-ROM (line code AE). Quarterly GDP is unavailable for several countries in the sample so we used quarterly industrial production indices for all countries as a proxy for national income. The industrial production series are from the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS line code 66). Our measure of money is from the IFS and is the sum of money (line code 34) plus quasi-money (line code 35) for all countries with the following exceptions for Great Britain, Norway, and Sweden due to availability. Money is M0 from the IFS for Great Britain, M2 from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators for Norway, and M3 also from the OECD for Sweden. Price levels, which we timated, we implement a two-step test of cointegration studied by Pedroni (1997) ¹ in which the t statistic is constructed from ADF regressions on residuals from a ¹ panel cointegrating regression. We bootstrap the ts to account for¯nite sample bias, cross-sectional dependence in the observations and for the fact that these tests are conducted on estimated residuals. The econometric speci¯cations underlying our cointegration tests are described in subsections 3.1 and 3.2. Subsection 3.3 reports the empirical results.
A Two-Step Panel Cointegration Test
In our two-step tests we¯rst run a panel cointegration regression and then apply the IPS test for a unit root in the regression residuals. The underlying econometric framework consists of a panel cointegrating regression, an ADF regression for the residuals, and a data generating process (DGP) that embodies the null hypothesis of no cointegration with which to build the parametric bootstrap distribution. We state the model here, then give an explanation of its components below.
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Eq. (3) is the panel cointegration regression where we have imposed monetary neutrality by de¯ning e = s ¡ (m ¡m ). We allow for the potential inclusion of three
deterministic components in the regression. The¯rst is an individual{speci¯c constant c , that controls for the base year problem resulting from our use of industrial i production indices to proxy for national income as well as for other non-time dependent heterogeneity in money market equilibrium across countries. The second is a deterministic trend¸t, that can be included to capture systematic changes in money i market equilibrium across countries perhaps induced by di®erential rates of¯nancial innovation that a®ect money demand. The third is a common time e®ect µ , that can t be included to capture world{wide macroeconomic shocks. The common time e®ect also captures all numeraire country speci¯c shocks, however, so ® is not identi¯ed 0 when µ is included in the regression. method as suggested by Campbell and Perron (1991) . ¹ Even though t is computed from estimated residuals from the panel regression, Pedroni (1997) shows that under cross-sectional independence of the z s, the asympit ¹ totic distribution of t will be the same as if it were computed from raw data. But we decline to use the IPS asymptotic distribution to perform cointegration tests for at least two reasons. First, their maintained assumption of independence across individuals is untenable in our study of bi-lateral exchange rates and second, we want to guard against possible small sample size distortion. ¹ To test hypotheses, we generate a parametric bootstrap distribution for t with the system given in eq.(5). The DGP is a restricted vector autoregression (VAR) for (¢e ; ¢y ; ¢y ) speci¯ed separately for each country that embodies the null it it 0t 6 hypothesis of no cointegration between fs g and ff g. We point out that we restrict it it the equation governing y in our VAR to be a univariate autoregression. This was 0t done to maintain uniqueness of the process governing y since an unrestricted VAR 0t would include lagged ¢e and lagged ¢y thus allowing the numeraire country's it it income process to vary across i. The individual equations of the DGP are¯tted by least squares with 4 lags. We account for dependence across cross-sectional units by estimating the joint error
where " = (" ; : : : ; " ; " ; : : : ; " ; " ) from the OLS
residuals. Ideally, we would like a DGP to jointly model the evolution of all of the variables across all 17 bilateral country pairs. This would imply an unrestricted VAR for 35 variables and would provide a proper accounting for the cross-sectional dependence across countries but estimating such a large system turns out not to be feasible. ¹ The bootstrap for t is built as follows. First, we draw a sequence of lengtĥ T + 100 innovation vectors according to" » N (0; §). Second, we generate the t pseudo{observations (ẽ ;ỹ ;ỹ ); i = 1; : : : ; N; t = 1; : : : ; T + 100 according to eq. (5) it it 0t using estimated values of the coe±cients. Third, after dropping the¯rst 100 pseudoobservations, run the cointegrating regression (3) on the pseudo{data and the ADF regression on the resulting regression residuals. This yields a realization of the IPS ¹ ¹ t statistic. Repeating these steps 2000 times yields the bootstrap distribution for t. An analogous procedure is followed to bootstrap all other statistics that we study in the paper.
A Priori Fixed Cointegration Vector
If instead of estimating ® and ® we set them to prespeci¯ed values, we can test
for cointegration between fs g and ff g directly as suggested by IPS using
and the DGP
Here, the various deterministic components appear directly in the generalized ADF ¹ regression and the t statistic is built from the t computed from eq.(6). The DGP, i given in eq. (7) buildup of the bootstrap distribution follows as described above in subsection 3.1.
Cointegration Test Results
We use the U.S. as the numeraire country. To provide a benchmark for our panel results, table 1 shows the outcome of univariate Engle{Granger cointegration (pvalue=0.75 ). Presumably the model is overparameterized with separate trends. An examination of the residuals revealed clear evidence of trend only for¯ve countries{ Great Britain, Japan, and Switzerland, Norway and Sweden. When we lighten the parameterization of the model by including trends only for these countries the evidence for cointegration becomes quite strong (p-value=0.016).
The results are qualitatively unchanged when we control for common time e®ects. As mentioned above, estimates of ® are not available when µ is included in the 0 t 7 It makes no di®erence whether the VAR is speci¯ed for (¢s ; ¢x ) or (¢s ; ¢f ) since x = it it it it it f ¡ s and there is an independent relationship between only two of the three variables.
it it 8 These tests were performed as described in section 3.1 except that the cointegrating regression is estimated individually for each exchange rate. regression but point estimates of ® appear to be robust to the inclusion of µ . When t separate linear trends are included for all countries in addition to the common time e®ects, the hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected at standard signi¯cance (p-value=0.37). Omitting the trends, or including them only for Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Switzerland and Sweden, allows the null hypothesis of no cointegration to be rejected at the 5 percent level (p-value=0.048).
Looking ahead to the next section, where we perform our out-of-sample forecasting experiment one option is to use z , the residual from eq.(3), as the independent it variable. Pursuing this option requires recursive updates of z and we would expect it to achieve accurate forecasts only if the estimates of (®; ® ) are reasonably stable 0 over time. To examine the stability issue,¯gure 1 plots recursive panel estimates of (®; ® ). While estimates of ® appear reasonably stable, the large dollar appreciation 0 and subsequent depreciation of the 1980s and the relatively short time span of the data combine to make our estimates of ® display considerable sample dependence.
0
To avoid these problems, we will pursue our analysis with a priori speci¯ed values of (®; ® ). We guide our choice of values by refering back to the full-sample estimates In addition to the fragmentary empirical evidence, there are institutional reasons that the asymmetric treatment of the ®¡coe±cients is sensible when the U.S. dollar serves as the numeraire currency. Certainly,¯xed coe±cient monetary models may not be su±ciently sophisticated to account for rapid U.S.¯nancial innovation. Innovations such as improved cash management techniques that reduce cash-°ow uncertainty and the reductions in the transactions costs involved in converting money into other¯nancial assets work in the direction of reducing the measured income elasticity of money demand. Now given these¯xed values of the ®{coe±cients, we re-examine the evidence for cointegration. Panel B of table 2 shows the results of tests for a unit root with x constructed with (®; ® ) = (1:0; 0:1). In comparison to the two-step tests, the it 0 evidence for cointegration largely unchanged when (®; ® ) are¯xed. The evidence for 0 cointegration is strengthened upon controlling for the common time e®ect.
Recall from the univariate tests that the null of no cointegration was rejected at the 10 percent level for Canada, Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands. to investigate the possibility that the panel test results are driven by these four series we perform the ¹ test by dropping them from the sample. The t statistic calculated from the remaining 13 countries has p-value=0.02 so the rejection does not appear to be driven by these 9 outliers.
It is worth pointing out that the asymptotic distribution would lead us to much stronger rejections of the null of no cointegration as the bootstrap distribution is evidently quite di®erent from the asymptotic distribution. For example, using the ¹ adjustment factors provided by IPS, the t = ¡1:916 in the¯rst row of table 2 has an asymptotic p-value of 0.021 as compared to our bootstrap p-value of 0.557. The size distortion could possibly be the result of any one of three factors. The¯rst might simply be small sample size distortion inherent in the IPS test. The second is the sampling variability introduced by using estimated residuals in the test, and the third is cross-sectional dependence. Size disortion is present even when the test is performed on raw data, however. Under¯xed ® coe±cients, common time e®ect but ¹ no trend, (panel B, row 4) the t = ¡2:011 has bootstrap p-value=0.103 as compared to an asymptotic p-value of 0.006.
Prediction
Under the hypothesis of cointegration, the long-horizon regression is a regression of the stationary exchange rate return on stationary exchange rate deviations from the monetary fundamental x . In this case, the study of monetary fundamentals it forecasts of exchange rate returns can proceed along the standard analysis of a panel regression with stationary variables.
If the hypothesis of cointegration is not maintained, the regression analysis of this section can be justi¯ed by appealing to Berben and Van Dijk (1998) , who argue that under the null of no cointegration, testing for a zero slope coe±cient in the longhorizon regression is equivalent to testing for weak exogeneity of the fundamentals. In the univariate setting assuming no cointegration between fs g and ff g, they it it
show that the OLS estimator in the univariate regression of ¢s on x converges it it to its population value of zero and that its asymptotic distribution (and that of its asymptotic t-ratio) is a mixture of a Gaussian distribution and a Dickey-Fuller distribution which can be used to test the joint hypothesis of no cointegration and no predictability. Although asymptotic inference may in fact be feasible for the panel regression, we continue to conduct inference on forecast performance with the parametric bootstrap.
Predictive Regressions
In this section, we center our analysis on the panel regression,
In light of the instability displayed by recursive estimates of (®; ® ) and the relative 0 insensitivity of the cointegration tests as to whether these coe±cients are estimated or¯xed at (®; ® ) = (1:0; 0:1) as discussed in section 3.3, we construct the predic- estimates (k=1)¯rst to avoid complications of residual serial dependence induced by forecasting over horizons exceeding the sampling interval of the data and second, to re°ect the growing consensus that long horizons yield no power advantages over short horizons. Our¯rst task here is to estimate¯= Cov(¢s ; x )=Var(x ) and test
the hypothesis¯= 0. assumptions regarding cointegration. Under our¯rst null hypothesis, the exchange rate evolves according to a martingale and is cointegrated with the monetary fundamentals. This null distribution is represented by the DGP,
it i it¡1 it¡j it¡j x 21;j 22;j xt j=1 j=1
We require ¡2 <°< 0 so that eq.(9) is equivalent to a restricted VAR in (¢s ; x )
which in turn is equivalent to a vector error-correction representation for (¢s ; ¢f )
it it with cointegration vector (1; ¡1). The estimation of the DGP and the buildup of the parametric bootstrap distribution follows the procedure described at teh end of subsection 3.1. Our second null hypothesis is that the exchange rate evolves according to a martingale, but is not cointegrated with the monetary fundamentals. The DGP underlying this version of the null sets°= 0 in eq.(9) (This DGP also was used previously and i is stated in eq. (7)). Table 3 shows the short-horizon panel regression results. Guided by our¯ndings 13 in the previous section, we control for the common time e®ect and include a linear trend for Great Britain, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Whether or not we assume cointegration under the null, the hypothesis of no predictability is easily rejected at standard signi¯cance levels. When the panel regression is run using PPP fundamentals (by setting x = p ¡p ¡s ), under cointegration, the null hypothesis
of no predictability can be rejected but under the null of no cointegration, it can not.
Out-of-Sample Prediction
Out-of-sample forecasts are generated both at a short-horizon (k=1) and at a long-horizon (k=16). We begin by estimating eq.(8) on observations available through 1983.1. The k=1 regression is then used to forecast the 1-quarter ahead exchange rate return in 1983.2 and the k=16 regression to forecast the 16 quarter ahead exchange rate return through 1987.1. We then update the sample by one period by adding the observation for 1983.2 and repeat the procedure. Recursively updating in this fashion leaves us with 57 k=1 forecasts and 41 overlapping k=16 forecasts. Because we could not devise a satisfactory way to forecast future values of µ , we do not include the t common time e®ect in generating the forecasts. This means that we cannot separate the contribution between the monetary fundamentals and the common time-e®ect for predictive performance. However, given the results of table 3, we are be reasonably con¯dent that the monetary fundamentals present a signi¯cant contribution.
We compare the panel monetary fundamentals regression forecasts against those of two alternative models. The¯rst comparison is made against the standard benchmark 10 forecast implied by the random walk model. The other comparison is against the 10 We follow Kilian (1997) who argues that it is appropriate to employ the random walk with drift. We also evaluated the monetary fundamentals forecasts against the driftless random walk|a model which researchers often¯nd performs better than the random walk with drift|but do not report those results to economize on space. For us, however, the results are robust to whether the drift is included.
predictions implied by PPP. Although many recent studies, using panel unit root tests on the log real exchange rate, have concluded that PPP has held over the°oat, 11 few serious evaluations of the predictive performance of PPP have been undertaken. These forecasts are generated by using deviations from
the panel regression. Relative forecast accuracy is measured by Theil's U-statistic|the ratio of the root-mean-square prediction error (RMSPE) from two competing models. We avoided using other statistics of prediction evaluation, such as Diebold{Mariano (1995) because, as documented in Berben and Van Dijk, the di±culty in accurately estimating long-run variances often results in misleading inference. The null hypothesis is that the monetary fundamentals (or PPP) and the random walk provide equally accurate forecasts (U=1). The alternative hypothesis is that the monetary fundamentals (or PPP) is more accurate than the random walk (U<1). We also perform joint tests of the hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy by using joint test statistics formed alternatively by taking the mean value and the median value of the U-statistics. P-values are the proportion of the bootstrap distribution that lie below (to the left) of the U-statistic calculated from the data. As in the previous section, these p-values are constructed both under the null of cointegration and no cointegration.
The prediction results are displayed in table 4. At the 1-quarter horizon, monetary fundamentals point predictions dominate the random walk in RMSPE for 14 of 17 exchange rates (Great Britain, Japan, and Norway are the exceptions). The improvement in forecast accuracy over the random walk is generally statistically signi¯cant at the 10 percent level for these 14 exchange rates whether under the null of cointegration or no cointegration In addition, both of the joint tests reject the hypothesis at the 10 percent level of equal prediction accuracy under either the null of cointegration or no cointegration.
The random walk is seen to dominate PPP in 6 cases. Under the null of cointegration, only two of the PPP U-statistics is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level while none are signi¯cant under the null of no cointegration. Similarly, neither of the joint tests reject the hypothesis of equal forecast accuracy at the 10 percent level. Looking at the last column of the table, it can be seen that monetary fundamentals point predictions dominate PPP predictions in RMPSE for all but 4 countries in the panel.
To provide a coarse description of the properties of the U-statistic bootstrap distribution, we note that under the null of cointegration, the mean of the distribution under the monetary fundamentals is generally symmetric about a modal value of 1.0 to four signi¯cant digits and the means coincide with the median values of 1.0 for 12 of the 17 countries (the largest mean value is 1.037 from the distribution for Sweden). The distributions are also tightly packed with an average standard deviation over the 17 distributions of 0.006. Under PPP, the grand mean of the U-statistic distributions is 1.008, indicating a small upward bias. The PPP distributions are also more spread out. The average standard deviation is 0.021, which exceeds those under the monetary model by an order of magnitude.
At the 16-quarter horizon, monetary fundamentals forecasts again dominate the random walk in RMSPE for 13 of 17 exchange rates (Australia, Canada, Greece, and Norway are the exceptions). Under either null of cointegration or no cointegration, the hypothesis that the monetary fundamentals and the random walk provide equal forecast accuracy can be rejected for 12 exchange rates at the 10 percent level. Moreover, both joint test statistics are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level under either null hypothesis of cointegration.
PPP performance at 16 quarters is inferior to that of the monetary fundamentals. Monetary fundamentals forecasts dominate PPP forecasts in RMSPE for 13 of 17 exchange rates (Australia, Canada, Korea, and Norway being the exceptions). While PPP point predictions have lower RMSPE than the random walk for 11 of 17 exchange rates, the improvement in prediction accuracy is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level only for 5 exchange rates under the null of cointegration and for 2 exchange rates under the null of no cointegration.
Alternative Numeraire Countries
It has been reported in the literature that evidence for PPP is not invariant to choice of numeraire country [see Papell (1997) and Wu (1997) ]. To investigate whether our results are purely a U.S. dollar phenomenon, we perform the econometric analysis on two alternative choices of numeraire: Switzerland and Japan. We give here a brief 12 description of the major results.
Switzerland as Numeraire Country
Panel cointegration tests with Switzerland as the numeraire country are presented in table 5. The Swiss franc results are less sensitive than the U.S. dollar results to inclusion of the common time e®ect. In the absense of trend, the estimates of ® range from 0.63 to 1.34. The panel estimates of ® near 1 are on the high side, but drop substantially when trends are included in the panel cointegrating regression. Including trends for every country generates substantial sampling variability which weakens the evidence for cointegration. An analysis of the residuals suggested including a trend for 6 countries{the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Norway, and Sweden. Upon inclusion, the null of no cointegration is rejected at the 5 percent level. Guided by the relatively large estimates of ®, we also run the unit root tests by¯xing (®; ® ) = (1:0; 1:0). This evidence largely supports the hypothesis of cointegration. 0 Table 6 reports estimates of the short-horizon panel regression. The null hypothesis of no predictability is easily rejected at the 10 percent level under either assumption regarding cointegration. Under PPP, however, the t-ratio is insigni¯cant At the 1-quarter horizon, monetary fundamental forecasts outperform the random walk for 10 exchange rates. The improvement in accuracy is signi¯cant at the 10 percent level in each of these cases under the null of cointegration and for 6 of the 10 countries under the null of no cointegration. PPP forecasts perform better, beating both the random walk in terms of RMPSE for 13 of 17 exchange rates with sign¯cant improvement in accuracy at the 10 percent level in each case under the null of cointegration and for 9 cases under the null of no cointegration. The monetary fundamentals dominate PPP forecasts in RMPSE in 5 instances.
At the 16 quarter horizon, monetary fundamentals forecasts outperform the random walk in terms of RMPSE for 13 exchange rates. Under the null of cointegration, they are all, whereas under the null of no cointegration, the improvement in accuracy is signi¯cant in 9 cases. PPP outperforms the random walk for 15 exchange rates. 10 of the predictions are signi¯cant at the 10 percent level under the null of cointegration and 5 are signi¯cant under the null of no cointegration. Point predictions of the monetary fundamentals dominate PPP in 10 cases.
To summarize, the Swiss franc forecast performance of the monetary fundamentals is roughly comparable to the results obtained with the U.S. dollar.
Japan as Numeraire Country
Panel cointegration tests for yen exchange rates are shown in table 8. The panel estimates of ® exceed 1 and are quite high but the estimates fall in size when separate 0 trends are included. Inspection of the residuals suggested that a trend be included only for 5 countries| the United States, Great Britain, France, Norway, and Sweden. When this is done, the null of no cointegration is easily rejected. Similar results are obtained when the common time e®ect is included. In general, the yen results do not appear to be sensitive to inclusion of the common time e®ect.
As with the Swiss franc, given the relatively large estimates of ®, we run unit root tests by¯xing (®; ® ) = (1:0; 1:0). Again, the evidence is somewhat weakened, but 0 the null of no cointegration can be rejected when trend is included for each country. Table 9 reports estimates for the short-horizon panel regression. The null hypothesis of cointegration and no predictability under the monetary fundamentals is easily rejected at very small signi¯cance levels. The null hypothesis of no cointegration and no predictability can also be rejected at the 10 percent level. Under PPP, the t-ratio is not signi¯cant (p-value=0.20) under the null hypothesis of no cointegration.
The out-of-sample prediction results for the yen are displayed in table 10. At the 1-quarter horizon, monetary fundamentals forecasts dominate the random walk in terms of RMPSE for 6 exchange rates whereas PPP forecasts outperform the random walk for 11 exchange rates. At the 16 quarter horizon, monetary fundamentals forecasts outperform the random walk in terms of RMPSE for 12 exchange rates. Under the null of cointegration, 8 of the U-statistics are signi¯cant at the 10 percent level whereas under the null of no cointegration, 6 are signi¯cant, as are the two joint test statistics. PPP forecasts outperform the random walk in terms of RMPSE for 11 exchange rates but only 6 of the individual U-statistics are signi¯cantly less than 1 under the null of cointegration and only 1 is signi¯cant under the null of no cointegration. The monetary fundamentals forecasts also dominate PPP forecasts in terms of RMPSE in 8 of 17 yen exchange rates.
Conclusions
Univariate analyses of the relation between exchange rate returns and monetary fundamentals are imprecise. By explointing cross-sectional information available in a small panel, we have sharpened our inference about this connection. The weight of the evidence{both from panel cointegration tests and the examination of panel short-horizon regression slope coe±cients{ suggests that the nominal exchange rate is cointegrated with monetary fundamentals and that the monetary fundamentals contain signi¯cant predictive power for future exchange rate movements. The evidence does not appear to be solely a U.S. dollar phenomenon.
Our results raise an economic question that is not solved by our analysis. The puzzle is why the predictive content of monetary fundamentals are evidently superior to those of PPP despite the fact that PPP is typically the building block upon which the link between the exchange rate and monetary fundamentals are formed. Monetary fundamentals point predictions most clearly dominated those of PPP for U.S. dollar exchange rates. While root-mean-square prediction errors for the two models were more evenly matched for the Swiss franc and yen exchange rates, the U-statistics of PPP forecasts displayed lower levels of statistical signi¯cance. Engel and Kim (1998), Canzoneri et. al (1996) report evidence that real exchange rates themselves contain relatively small, slow moving permanent components. One point of speculation for the poor PPP forecast performance may be the failure to account for embedded random walk dynamics. A second possibility may be that the monetary fundametals provide a better estimate of the long-run equilibrium price level than does the currently observed price level.
